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FREE SPEECH IN THE BALANCE: JUDICIAL
SANCTIONS AND FRIVOLOUS SLAPP SUITS
Shine Sean Tu* & Nicholas F. Stump**
The balance between free speech and access to courts in
defamation tort actions is fraught with public policy concerns. On one
hand, plaintiffs should have unencumbered access to the justice system
to remedy real harms brought upon them by defamatory statements.
However, defamation suits should not be wielded to suppress the
constitutionally protected free speech rights of news organizations and
of concerned citizens that are vital for well-functioning democracies.
This Article argues for a new type of remedy, namely enhanced Rule 11
attorney sanctions, such as suspension or debarment, that should be
available to defendants of defamation suits brought by repeat players
that use “cookie-cutter” complaints. This Article specifically proposes a
novel four-part test implicating use of attorney sanctions as a remedy for
filing niche types of frivolous lawsuits. Per this test, a court should weigh
the following factors to determine if such sanctions are warranted: (1) if
the plaintiff habitually files and loses defamation-type suits to prevent
protected free speech; (2) the nature of the defendant, especially if the
defendant is a news organization; (3) the proportionality of the damages
requested, and; (4) if a countersuit is at issue.
In this Article, we examine a case study in the form of a decades’
long frivolous litigation pattern exhibited by Murray Energy and Robert
Murray as its CEO. Murray Energy has been characterized as the single
largest privately-owned coal corporation in the United States, and thus
constitutes a prominent actor well-suited for assessing the potential
strengths and weaknesses of developing this new remedy. We ultimately
conclude that enhanced Rule 11 attorney sanctions, as weighed and
levied vis-à-vis the proffered test, could constitute a potentially potent
deterrent to frivolous lawsuits designed to inhibit the free speech of the
press and of concerned citizens—which indeed occupy a crucial
watchdog role in healthy democracies.

* Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development and Professor of Law at West
Virginia University College of Law. This work was funded in part by the generous support of the
West Virginia University College of Law Hodges Research Fund. Sincere thanks to Robert M.
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INTRODUCTION
Current remedies are ineffective at halting frivolous lawsuits
intended to suppress constitutionally protected free speech, rather than
to make the injured party whole—generally termed Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation (SLAPP) suits.1 Remedies for such
frivolous lawsuits include early dismissal at the 12(b)(6) stage as well
as attorney’s fees.2 However, such monetary remedies often prove
insufficient when the legally savvy, well-capitalized parties that
typically bring SLAPP suits make a simple cost-benefit analysis. That
is, such parties conclude that the benefits of suppressing critical
speech via SLAPP suits—i.e., including the projected future benefits
of chilling later-in-time critical speech—outweighs the direct costs of
any monetary sanctions.3 Rational SLAPP suit filers therefore often
determine that these frivolous suits constitute, on the balance, an
exceedingly fair bargain; consequently, the free speech of the press
and of related watchdog entities is suppressed by such powerful
actors—to the profound detriment of core democratic principles.4
This Article argues for a new remedy to combat such frivolous
lawsuits, which involves courts utilizing a four-part test to determine
if Rule 11 sanctions are warranted. We argue that, in certain situations,
deterrence is best achieved when sanctions are directed towards the
attorneys filing frivolous lawsuits, and not the plaintiffs bringing
them. Thus, to achieve actual deterrence, courts should apply
sanctions against attorneys that file such suits—as compared to the
well-capitalized clients that prove all too willing to absorb the
relatively small monetary sanctions. Moreover, the appropriate
remedy for particularly egregious SLAPP suits should be attorney
suspension or debarment; as noted above, monetary damages often
prove insufficient in deterring powerful plaintiffs, and thus such
institutional-professional ramifications for involved attorneys are
required for true deterrence. Attorneys, then, should function as
gatekeepers against frivolous lawsuits—which is a proper role given
their institutional expertise and ethical responsibilities. As this Article
1. Laura J. Ericson-Siegel, Comment, Silencing SLAPPs: An Examination of Proposed
Legislative Remedies and a “Solution” for Florida, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 496 (1992).
2. Id; Michael Eric Johnston, A Better SLAPP Trap: Washington State’s Enhanced Statutory
Protection for Targets of “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation”, 38 GONZ. L. REV.
263, 264 (2002/3).
3. Johnston, supra note 2, at 264.
4. Id.
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contends, such enhanced sanctions are warranted for those particularly
egregious circumstances where attorneys merely “cut and paste”
complaints from suits previously dismissed at the 12(b)(6) or
summary judgment stage.
This Article examines a case study as one important exemplar of
such egregious misconduct: a decades’ long litigation pattern
exhibited by Murray Energy, pertinent subsidiaries, and Robert
Murray as its CEO designed to halt the critical speech of news
agencies. Our case study reveals that such “cut and paste” complaint
strategies were utilized in a series of cases dismissed at the 12(b)(6) or
summary judgment stage in the Murray Energy litigation context—
and that traditional remedies designed to curtail such frivolous suits
indeed proved insufficient. As a consequence, this case study
demonstrates that the variety of enhanced Rule 11 sanctions explored
in this Article likely are required to combat such deeply problematic
litigation patterns.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I provides an overview
of SLAPP suits and of anti-SLAPP legislation adopted in some
jurisdictions. Part II proffers a case study in the form of particularly
egregious SLAPP litigation pattern exhibited by Murray enterprises.
Part III discusses potential solutions to frivolous SLAPP suits. Part IV
focuses on the use of Rule 11 sanctions to deter attorneys from filing
frivolous suits. Part V proposes a novel, four-part test to determine if
such enhanced attorney sanctions are warranted. Finally, Part VI
ultimately concludes that enhanced Rule 11 attorney sanctions likely
are required to curtail such frivolous lawsuits that are greatly
detrimental to free speech of the press and thus ultimately to core
democratic values.
I. STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION SUITS
SLAPP suits are civil lawsuits generally filed against news
organizations, private individuals, or non-governmental agencies that
communicate with government bodies, officials, or the electorate on
specific issues of public interest or concern.5 These suits can involve
environmental concerns; neighborhood concerns (e.g., siting issues
involving dumps, toxic waste disposals, and mines); dissatisfied
5. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENV’T L. REV. 3, 7–8 (1989).
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consumers or tenants; and opponents of urban or suburban
development.6 As examples, SLAPP suits often are filed by “real
estate developers, property owners, police officers, alleged polluters,
business owners, and state or local government agencies.”7 The goals
of SLAPP suits are fourfold: (1) to recover for financial losses due to
successful opposition regarding an issue of public interest; (2) to
prevent future losses on similar subsequent public policy issues; (3) to
intimidate and deter others from joining the opposition; and (4) to
silence current and future opposition to the political issue.8
SLAPP suit filers improperly wield litigation as an instrument to
suppress political claims and public debate.9 The filer focuses on the
judicial process to silence the target and has scant concern about the
substantive outcome of the litigation.10 SLAPP filers utilize the
judicial system because of perceived and genuine advantages. First,
filers—unlike respondents—typically have the advantage of
familiarity with the judicial system. Second, use of the judicial system
advantages filers with access to large amounts of capital. Third, there
is the potential psychological trauma individual respondents
experience when faced with multimillion-dollar lawsuits—i.e., filers
use the legal system as a psychological weapon.11 And more broadly,
damage to reputational, personal, financial, and psychological
interests are harms that are usually not as poignant with corporations
as compared to individual respondents.12 Fourth, and finally, SLAPP
filers have an added advantage of reaping indirect, later-in-time
benefits, in that such suits disincentivize future parties from filing suit
or bringing public attention to the issue due to fear of financial
retribution.13

6. Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 23,
25 (1989).
7. Id. at 26.
8. Ericson-Siegel, supra note 1, at 492.
9. Canan, supra note 6, at 23.
10. J. Reid Mowrer, Casenote, Protection of the Public Against Litigious Suits (“PPALS”):
Using 1993 Federal Rule 11 to Turn SLAPPs Around, 38 NAT. RES. J. 465, 466 (1998).
11. Canan, supra note 6, at 26 (stating that the average SLAPP suit was for $9 million).
12. Id. at 26–29 (describing the case of Victor Monia whose career and personal life were
detrimentally affected by his fear of a $40,150,000 suit).
13. Id. (describing a SLAPP lawsuit brought by Parnas Corporation against multiple
homeowners’ associations and their presidents in which the company deposed city council
members to cause fear in the community and which led to the homeowners’ groups dissolving
because they feared the financial liability associated with the suit).
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SLAPP suits constitute a particularly enticing option for those
filers that possess substantial amounts of capital. Specifically, for
those filers who are worth millions or even billions of dollars, a few
thousand spent on legal fees to suppress negative speech may be an
exceedingly fair bargain.14 For instance, with “eco-SLAPP suits”—
i.e., as discussed in more detail below—investment of thousands of
dollars to suppress negative press is often a profitable investment in
the long term.
Statistically, most SLAPP defendants prevail, but only after an
average of thirty-six months in the litigation process. 15 Savvy filers
can leverage their expertise with the legal system to strategically
extend the process. Thus, even with a favorable dismissal of the suit,
the legal fees can cost more than $20,000.16 And simply seeking a high
damage award can create multidimensional problems for the SLAPP
target; for instance, defendants “can face bankruptcy, loss of credit,
and foreclosure” in contesting such frivolous suits.17
SLAPP suits also produce a significant social cost. SLAPP suits,
by their very nature, aim to chill debate on important public and
political issues. SLAPP suits attempt to decrease public participation
and suppress the speech of those who may raise valid concerns—
which thus routinely imperils the free speech rights of news
organizations and related entities that occupy a crucial watchdog role
in democracies.18 Ripple effects of SLAPP suits also are far-reaching,
as the broader organizations involved in SLAPP suits can see
decreased membership and participation, resulting in such
organizations becoming defunct or disbanded.19

14. Victor J. Cosentino, Comment, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An
Analysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 410 (1991).
15. Canan, supra note 6, at 26.
16. Ericson-Siegel, supra note 1, at 494.
17. Id.
18. Ralph Michael Stein, SLAPP Suits: A Slap at the First Amendment, 7 PACE ENV’T L. REV.
45, 53 (1989).
19. Id.; see also Canan, supra note 6, at 29 (explaining that three homeowners’ groups “fell
apart” as members “withdrew from the organizations, afraid that they would be swept under
$40,150,000 worth of liability”); Robert H. Boyle, Activists at Risk of Being SLAPPed, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 25, 1991, at 6, 7–8 (quoting Victor Monia regarding a SLAPP suit brought by
Parnas Corporation against the West Valley Taxpayers and Environmentalists Association: “We
had had a very active organization with 550 homeowners . . . . The year after the suit . . . .
[m]embership had dropped to 100, and by the second year of the suit, it was really only the board
of directors and hard-core folks, about 25 of us, who were left.”).
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A. “Eco-SLAPP” Litigation
Eco-SLAPP litigation emerged in the early 1970s to oppose the
rising environmental movement.20 Eco-SLAPP litigation follows a
formulaic pattern: environmentalists initially petition the government
and/or news agencies or bring specific environmental concerns to the
public’s attention.21 Thereafter, the opposing party sues these
environmentalists or news agencies for monetary damages based on
defamation or tortious interference with contract.22 These eco-SLAPP
suits usually have two goals in mind. First, such suits can result in real
monetary hardship for defendants.23 Second, eco-SLAPP suits can
produce a chilling effect on free speech—as news agencies or
concerned individuals will refrain, in the future, from bringing such
matters of environmental concern to the broad public’s attention due
to fear of legal retribution.24
Many eco-SLAPP suits, however, prove unsuccessful on the
substantive merits. For instance, in Sierra Club v. Butz,25 a U.S.
District Court dismissed the counterclaim and stated:
[T]he First Amendment provision guaranteeing the right of
the people to petition the government for a redress . . . . is a
basic freedom in a participatory government . . . these are the
“indispensable democratic freedoms” that cannot be
abridged if a government is to continue to reflect the desires
of the people.26
But libel and defamation actions are notoriously expensive and
difficult to defend.27 Furthermore, the mere threat of being put in
defense of a lawsuit may chill the exercise of First Amendment
20. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT
84 (1996).
21. Id.
22. See generally id. at 83–104 (stating numerous opposing parties who sought monetary
damages based on defamation or tortious interference with contract).
23. As representative examples, in Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.
1991), Dr. Moor-Jankowski spent more than $1 million and seven years defending a SLAPP suit;
and in Hodgins Kennels, Inc. v. Durbin, 429 N.W.2d 189 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d in part, 438
N.W. 2d 247 (Mich. 1989) (mem.), five animal welfare advocates in Michigan settled for over
$800,000 and spent nine years in court, whereas the kennel owners were awarded $329,739 in
damages. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 20, at 100–03.
24. Canan, supra note 6, at 30.
25. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
26. Id. at 936.
27. Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, Behind the U.S. Reports: Justice Brennan’s Unpublished
Opinions and Memoranda in New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Progeny, 19 COMMC’N L. &
POL’Y 227, 246 (2014).
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freedoms.28 Consequently, there is legitimate concern that eco-SLAPP
suits are improperly wielded by such powerful actors to harass and
coerce their targets, and thus such suits are deeply problematic from a
public policy standpoint.
B. SLAPP Suits Against the Media
Frivolous lawsuits directed towards media outlets are a second
subcategory of SLAPP suit.29 These suits increasingly are gaining
public prominence as President Trump continues to threaten the press,
focusing expressly on news organizations.30 There are two different
funding models for SLAPP suits directed against the media: (1) direct
litigation—wherein well-capitalized entities (e.g., billionaires) sue
news organization directly; and (2) indirect litigation—wherein such
powerful entities set up funds for the broader purpose of defraying
litigation costs for any parties seeking to sue news organizations.31
Indirect funding for litigation constitutes a particularly egregious
mechanism when effectuated covertly—i.e., as such tactics enhance
the chilling effect of lawsuits. That is, covert third-party funding often
has an ultimate goal of achieving censorship of the target and not of
legitimate compensation for alleged tortfeasor harms.32 Accordingly,
if a suit is funded by a third party with improper censorship
motivations, then such bad-faith actors might “embrace economically
questionable scorched-earth litigation tactics or refuse reasonable
settlements in order to increase the costs of publication.”33 This type
of litigation may intimidate publishers and news organizations to
avoid publishing “liberal” messages as opposed to “conservative”
articles due to distorted litigation costs.34 Ultimately, then, such
mechanisms can greatly compromise freedoms of speech and of the

28. Stein, supra note 18, at 53.
29. See generally Lili Levi, The Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation Funding
as a New Threat to Journalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 761 (2017) (discussing SLAPP suits brought
against media and its effects).
30. Justin Wise, Trump Escalates Fight Against Press with Libel Lawsuits, THE HILL (Mar. 8,
2020, 6:02 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/media/486273-trump-escalates-fight-againstpress-with-libel-lawsuits.
31. Levi, supra note 29, at 763–64 n.4.
32. Id. at 782–83.
33. Id. at 785.
34. Id. at 785–86.
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press—which, of course, implicate core democratic-constitutional
principles.35
II. CASE STUDY: ROBERT MURRAY AND MURRAY ENERGY
Murray Energy has been characterized as the largest privately
owned coal corporation in the nation.36 Murray claims to operate
seventeen mines in the United States and Colombia with
approximately seven thousand employees.37 Throughout the time
period of pertinent litigation, Murray Energy’s chairman, president,
and chief executive officer (CEO) was Robert E. Murray.38 Over the
years, Murray Energy and its CEO very publicly voiced opposition or
support for various energy policies, depending on the shifting politics
of presidential administrations.39

35. Id. at 784–85.
36. Broghan Swart, Is Murray Energy the Nation’s Largest Coal Company?, POLITIFACT
(Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/west-virginia/statements/2019/nov/08/joe-manchin/
murray-energy-nations-largest-coal-company/. Note that like numerous other coal corporations in
the prior decade, Murray Energy filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in October 2019. See, e.g., Pippa
Stevens, Murray Energy Joins Growing List of Coal Companies to Declare Bankruptcy, CNBC
(Oct. 29, 2019, 9:17 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/29/murray-energy-joins-list-of-coalcompanies-to-declare-bankruptcy.html. Despite this recent bankruptcy filing, Murray Energy
nevertheless constitutes an exceedingly useful case model for this Article due to both (1) Murray’s
decades-long litigation pattern involving “cookie-cutter” complaints and court dismissals, and (2)
the acute national attention given to Murray’s misconduct in very recent years.
37. Corporate Overview, MURRAY ENERGY CORP., http://www.murrayenergycorp.com/
corporate-overview/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) [https://web.archive.org/web/20200828183821/
http://www.murrayenergycorp.com/corporate-overview/] [hereinafter Murray Corporate
Overview].
38. Robert E. Murray, A Message from Our Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer,
MURRAY ENERGY CORP., http://www.murrayenergycorp.com/message-from-the-founder-ceo/
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020) [https://web.archive.org/web/20180328145108/http://www.murrayen
ergycorp.com/message-from-the-founder-ceo/].
39. Lisa Friedman, How a Coal Baron’s Wish List Became Trump’s To-Do List, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 9, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2ErSbf0; see also Murray, supra note 38 (“[O]ur industry is
embattled from excessive federal government regulations from the Obama Administration and by
the increased use of natural gas for the generation of electricity.”); Matthew Kazin, Murray Energy
CEO on What’s Smothering the Coal Industry, FOXBUSINESS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.foxbu
siness.com/politics/murray-energy-ceo-on-whats-smothering-the-coal-industry (quoting Robert E.
Murray as blaming the coal industry’s decline on “the Obama Administration and the Democrat
Party and the Democrats in Washington D.C.” and commenting that Ted Cruz was his favored
candidate in the 2016 presidential race because he “has shown concern about low-cost electricity”);
More Obama-Era Coal Rules Should be Rolled Back: Murray Energy CEO, FOXBUSINESS
(July 20, 2018), https://www.foxbusiness.com/energy/more-obama-era-coal-rules-should-berolled-back-murray-energy-ceo (quoting Robert E. Murray praising the Trump Administration for
easing energy regulations and urging President Trump to do more to prevent coal-fired plants from
closing).
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On June 21, 2017, Murray Energy and Robert Murray as its CEO
sued television host and comedian John Oliver for defamation in a
West Virginia court, after Oliver aired a segment critical of Murray
and his corporation.40 The Oliver case was dismissed from circuit
court less than a year later.41 A few months prior to the Oliver suit,
Murray Energy had, in fact, sued the New York Times for defamation
in the same West Virginia court.42 And both suits occurred within a
much broader context spanning two decades wherein Murray filed a
series of lawsuits against media and individual citizens critical of
Murray enterprises.43
As West Virginia, like many jurisdictions, lacks anti-SLAPP
legislation—i.e., unpacked at length below—courts should utilize
common law doctrine regarding free speech and their sanctioning
powers under Rule 11 to combat bad-faith actors that systematically
file frivolous lawsuits to curtail public debate.44 As the American Civil
40. See Complaint at 1, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-C-124 (W. Va. Cir. Ct.
June 21, 2017) [hereinafter Oliver Complaint]; Kevin Lui, Coal Boss Robert Murray Is Suing John
Oliver After Being Mocked on Last Week Tonight, TIME (June 23, 2017, 9:28 AM),
http://time.com/4829720/john-oliver-lawsuit-robert-murray-coal/.
41. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim at 1, 27–28, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-C-124 (W. Va.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Oliver Complaint].
42. See Complaint at 1, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. The N.Y. Times Co., No. 17-C-70 (W. Va.
Cir. Ct. May 3, 2017) [hereinafter The N.Y. Times Complaint].
43. See infra Table 1.
44. S.B. 698, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2007) (introduced version),
http://www.wvlegislature.gov/bill_status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=sb698%20intr.htm&yr=2007&se
sstype=RS&i=698. The bill, titled the “Anti-SLAPP Actions Act,” was introduced February 19,
2007, and sponsored by Senator Unger with no other sponsors. It was referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary but died in Committee. See Bill Status—2007 Regular Session: Senate Bill 698, W.
VA. LEG., http://www.wvlegislature.gov/bill_status/bills_history.cfm?year=2007&sessiontype=R
S&input=698 (last visited Nov. 22, 2020); see generally Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of L. Exam’rs,
266 S.E.2d 444, 449 (W. Va. 1980) (concluding that the West Virginia Constitution’s limitations
on the power of the government to inquire about associations and speech is more stringent than the
federal Constitution); Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 37 (W. Va. 1981) (finding an absolute privilege
for free speech regarding matters of a public concern in the context of an environmental group
speaking out about violations of a coal company), overruled by Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549
(W. Va. 1993); Woodruff v. Bd. of Trs. of Cabell Huntington Hosp., 319 S.E.2d 372, 379 (W. Va.
1984) (regarding whether a collective bargaining agreement could waive the rights of the workers
from picketing; deciding that the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights under the West
Virginia state constitution “is more stringent . . . than is the federal constitution”); Long v. Egnor,
346 S.E.2d 778, 782 (W. Va. 1986) (granting a writ of prohibition where an action was filed against
the West Virginia Educational Association and its employee by individuals of the Cabell County
Board of Education for allegations in a memorandum alleging harassment and coercion because of
the risk of chilling effects should the case proceed); State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan, 480 S.E.2d
548, 565 (W. Va. 1996) (granting a writ of prohibition to stop the proceedings of a libel suit against
the Ohio County Education Association and its former president after publications and
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Liberties Union of West Virginia succinctly outlines in its amicus
curiae brief in the Oliver case, the lawsuit was baseless, Murray
Energy and its CEO have a history of filing such speech-chilling cases,
and it is within the power of the court to issue Rule 11 sanctions
against plaintiffs for such a clear abuse of litigation and to deter similar
conduct in the future.45 We concur with such arguments: when the
object is not to prevail on the merits, but rather to merely silence
opponents, such bad-faith actors must receive adequate punishment.
This is required from the standpoint of sound public policy and in the
interests of maintaining core democratic-constitutional values.46
A. The John Oliver Defamation Case
On June 18, 2017, the late-night news satire program “Last Week
Tonight” aired an HBO segment on the coal industry critical of Robert
Murray and Murray Energy—specifically regarding their role in
degrading coal-mining safety.47 Prior to the segment’s air date,
Murray’s attorneys sent a cease-and-desist letter warning the show and
its host that if aired, litigation would ensue.48 On June 21, 2017,
Murray Energy, certain Murray Energy subsidiaries,49 and Robert
Murray filed a lengthy defamation lawsuit against John Oliver,
Charles Wilson, Partially Important Productions, LLC, Home Box
Office, Inc., Time Warner, Inc., and Does 1 through 10 in reaction to
the airing of the segment and its subsequent YouTube posting.50 The
tort claims included defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.51 Requested relief included
general damages, special damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees

advertisements in the Wheeling Register named healthcare providers withdrawing from certain state
insurance programs); Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549, 552 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that the right
to petition the government in connection with an issue of public interest is entitled to heightened
protection); see also infra Table 1.
45. Proposed Amended Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union of West
Virginia Foundation in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and in
Support of Dismissal and Rule 11 Sanctions at 1–2, 10, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17CV-99 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 2, 2017) [hereinafter ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief].
46. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 402–03.
47. Lui, supra note 40.
48. Id.
49. Specifically, Marshall County Coal Company, The Marion County Coal Company, The
Monongalia County Coal Company, The Harrison County Coal Company, and The Ohio County
Coal Company. See Oliver Complaint, supra note 40, at 1.
50. See generally id. at 17 (indicating the subsequent posting of the episode on YouTube).
51. See generally id. at 17, 19, 21 (stating all the causes of action brought by plaintiffs).

(12) 54.2_TU & STUMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

634

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

4/23/21 9:58 AM

[Vol. 54:623

and costs of suit, and, importantly, a permanent injunction
“prohibiting rebroadcast of the Defamatory Statements and requiring
the removal of the Defamatory Statements from public access.”52
The West Virginia circuit court advised that it would grant the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.53 Accordingly, the
circuit court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, dismissing the complaint on March 15, 2018.54 The final
order was entered on April 4, 2018.55 The plaintiffs appealed the
decision to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on April 13,
2018.56
This litigation exhibits the classic anatomy of a SLAPP suit: a
powerful entity sued a target for claims such as defamation and false
light in clear retaliation for critical speech in an attempt to silence that
party—which quite literally involved, in this case, a request to prohibit
the segment’s rebroadcast.57 However, the anatomy of this specific
case is not the only factor we can weigh in ultimately classifying it as
a SLAPP suit. That is, the Oliver litigation is merely one of a series of
cases filed by Murray Energy, pertinent subsidiaries, and Robert
Murray as Murray Energy’s CEO in the past two decades involving
similar claims against the media, individual citizens, and union
officials that have spoken or published critical information about
Murray enterprises—i.e., with a majority of those cases being
dismissed at the same stage of the proceeding.58
As one significant and foundational example, a court previously
chastised Murray for filing “virtually identical” complaints.59 In the
2002 Murray v. Tarley60 case, Murray sued the Secretary-Treasurer of
the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) for “malicious
defamation arising from allegedly false and defamatory public
52. See generally id. at 22–23 (indicating all relief sought by the plaintiffs).
53. Letter from Hon. Jeffrey D. Cramer, C.J., Second Judicial Circuit, to Counsel (Feb. 21,
2018), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wpcontent/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2018/20180221_docket-17-C-124_letter.pdf.
54. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Oliver Complaint, supra note 41, at 1–2.
55. See Docket Entries, Final Order Entered, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-C124 (Apr. 4, 2018).
56. See Docket Entries, Notice of Appeal (Supreme Court of Appeals of WV.) and Its
Attachments, Marshall Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-C-124 (Apr. 13, 2018).
57. See generally Oliver Complaint, supra note 40 (epitomizing the general anatomy of a
SLAPP suit).
58. See infra Table 2; ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 45, at 1–2.
59. Murray v. Tarley, No. C2-01-693, 2002 WL 484537, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2002).
60. No. C2-01-693, 2002 WL 484537 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2002).
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statements . . . in three press releases and at a public rally” during the
course of collective bargaining agreements between the UMWA
representing the miners at the Powhatan No. 6 Mine and the
company.61 The court raised the issue of res judicata sua sponte
because plaintiffs sued the same party for an identical action in the
Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.62 In
this case, just one month previously, in January 2002, the court
dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1).63
The court noted that the “Amended Complaints in each case are
virtually identical.”64
Taken as a whole, then, the most appropriate classification for the
Oliver case is that of a SLAPP suit whose aims are to impede
constitutional free speech rights. This assertion is not only supported
by the complaint itself, but also by the fact that these suits were routine
for Murray Energy and Robert Murray as its CEO over the course of
two decades—i.e., as illustrated by yet more examples discussed
below beyond Tarley and detailed in the two Tables appended to this
Article.65 Here, we are concerned with an abuse of litigation by
Murray for the clear purpose of chilling free speech, which indeed
arises when a party exhibits a pattern of frivolous lawsuits filed with
complaints of strikingly similar construction year after year.66 Despite
case dismissal or settlement in many instances, the chilling of speech
still occurs, thereby achieving the actual purpose of the lawsuit—and
not success of the case on the substantive merits.67
61. Id. at *1.
62. Id. at *8.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *9.
65. See infra Table 1 and Table 2; ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 45, at 1–2.
66. In its amicus brief, the American Civil Liberties Union of West Virginia points out the
repeated filings of Murray over the past two decades, as well as the role of Rule 11 in deterring
future abuse. See ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 45, at 5–6, 14. See generally Marshall
Cnty. Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 5:17-CV-99, 2017 WL 10436072 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 10, 2017).
67. In our present case study, cases dismissed at the 12(b)(6) stage include Murray v. Moyers,
No. 2:14-CV-02334, 2015 WL 5626509 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2015) (defamation claim dismissed);
Murray v. HuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 879 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (defamation action
dismissed); Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Oliver Complaint, supra note 41, at 1–2 (defamation
action dismissed); Tarley, 2002 WL 484537, at *1 (defamation action dismissed); Murray Energy
Holdings Co. v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 2:15-CV-2845, 2016 WL 3355456 (S.D. Ohio June 17,
2016) (defamation claim dismissed). Cases dismissed at the summary judgment stage include
Chagrin; however, there was still a retraction of the article at issue. Murray v. Chagrin Valley
Publ’g Co., 25 N.E.3d 1111 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (dismissal affirmed); see infra Table 2; see also
ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 45, at 1–2. And the Knight-Ridder case had a reversal of
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B. A Pattern and Practice: A Comparison of Complaints
Lawsuits with similar causes of action will logically bear some
resemblance; nevertheless, the degree to which Murray Energy and its
subsidiaries’ complaints resemble and indeed copy one another is
striking and cause for concern from a public policy standpoint.68 As
Victor Cosentino argues, there can be a great deal of difficulty in
distinguishing a SLAPP suit from “legitimate tort cases” because the
causes of action are generally torts.69 Hence, he recognizes the need to
closely investigate the “motive in suing.”70
Based on our close examination, however, the motive of Murray
Energy and related parties is clear: to chill the constitutionally
protected free speech of critics. In a general sense, Murray Energy’s
filing of practically identical complaints in two different jurisdictions
in the early 2000s foreshadowed the appearance of “cut and paste”
complaints filed in the years to come against various reporters,
newspapers, broadcasting companies, bloggers, cartoonists, and a
television host.71 Six complaints filed by Murray Energy, its CEO, or
one of the subsidiaries had multiple paragraphs that were either
identical or nearly identical.72 Granted, some counts, by their very
nature, will be similar, and the facts examined are not identical.73
Nevertheless, because the Murray complaints contain such
similar language—as combined with the causes of action deployed,
the targets of the litigation, the frequency in which the cases were
filed, and their ultimate dismissals—our case study reveals that the
suits were brought for an improper, frivolous purpose: to
unconstitutionally suppress critics speaking out on matters of great
public concern.74 And as we argue in more detail below, under Rule

summary judgment, settlement, and a retraction of article. Murray v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., No. 02
BE 45, 2004 WL 333250 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2004) (defamation action dismissed).
68. See infra Table 2.
69. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 401–02.
70. Id. at 401.
71. See Tarley, 2002 WL 484537, at *9; infra Table 1.
72. See infra Table 1.
73. See infra Table 1.
74. Pring and Canan list the typical claims signaling a potential SLAPP as follows:
1. Defamation (libel, slander, etc.); 2. Business torts (interference with business,
economic expectancy, contract, etc.; product disparagement, and antitrust or restraint of
trade); 3. Judicial-administrative torts (malicious prosecution, abuse of process); 4.
Conspiracy (to commit any of these torts); 5. Constitutional and civil rights violations
(chiefly “taking” of filer’s property and unlawful “discrimination” against filer); and 6.
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11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and controlling West
Virginia case law, imposition of sanctions is appropriate when there
has been a pattern of improper practice within a lawsuit by a party or
attorney.75
C. Silencing the Media
In select cases involving Murray Energy, media outlets were
unwilling to risk litigation, most likely due to the high costs of
litigation and to concerns regarding high damages sought.
Additionally, some activist groups have settled with Murray to avoid
delays in their mission potentially associated with prolonged
litigation. In these cases, Murray succeeded in silencing key voices in
public discourse, while also sending a clear chilling message to all

Miscellaneous wrong (including nuisance, invasion of privacy, attack on nonprofit tax
status, etc.).
George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation”
(“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 947
(1992). They go on to list “six broad dispute areas”: “1. Real estate development and zoning; 2.
Criticism of public officials and employees; 3. Environmental protection and animal rights; 4. Civil
rights (race, gender, employment, and other forms of discrimination); 5. Neighborhood problems
(frequently characterized as the ‘Not In My Back Yard’ or ‘NIMBY’ syndrome); and 6. Consumer
issues.” Id. Further, their early study showed that most SLAPPs were dismissed. Id. at 944.
75. W. VA. CODE. ANN. R. 11 (LexisNexis 2021):
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, and attorney
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing
law or by a non frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, of
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions
state below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
Considerations for the imposition of sanctions under West Virginia law were established under
Bartles v. Hinkle: “[T]o determine what will constitute an appropriate sanction, a court may
consider the seriousness of the conduct, the impact the conduct had in the case and in the
administration of justice, any mitigating circumstances, and whether the conduct was an isolated
occurrence or was a pattern of wrongdoing throughout the case.” Bartles v. Hinkle, 472 S.E.2d 827,
836 (W. Va. 1996).
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potential future media outlets who may seek to publish critical
analyses of Murray.
As a prime example, following a mine accident of Murray Energy
in Utah, the publication Coal Age ran a critical editorial about
Murray’s subsequent press conference. After Murray threated to sue
Steve Fiscor, editor of Coal Age and of Engineering & Mining
Journal, the journal issued an apology to Murray for the editorial.76
As another example, Robert Murray sued a Washington, D.C. based
advocacy group, Public Citizen, for radio ads attacking him.77 Public
Citizen settled with Murray and paid $7,500 for the legal costs of
removing the lawsuit from federal to state court.78 As yet another
example, in 2001, Murray sued Margaret Newkirk, a former reporter
for the Akron Beacon Journal, after she wrote an article profiling
Murray and his status in the coal industry.79 The newspaper and
Murray reached a settlement involving the Beacon issuing what
Murray called a “retraction”—as the Beacon published an article
stating that the prior editorial contained material “from which a reader
could have drawn incorrect conclusions” about Murray, and that the
paper “regrets any harm to [Murray], his family or his business.”80
Interestingly, one news article relayed that “[a]s far as Mr. Murray is
concerned, any payment is an admission of guilt and an indication that
in this lawsuit, Murray Energy has won.”81
III. BREAKING THE PATTERN
A. Anti-SLAPP Statutes
The court in one Murray suit examined in this case study, Murray
v. Chagrin Valley Publishing Co.,82 called for the Ohio legislature to

76. Anya Litvak, Coal Company Owner on a Mission to Save His Industry, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 10, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://www.postgazette.com/business/powersource/2015/10/11/Murray-Energy-owner-Robert-Murray-on-amission-to-save-his-industry/stories/201510110111; Jonathan Peters, A Coal Magnate’s Latest
Lawsuit Was Tossed—but Ohio Can Do More to Defend Free Expression, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. (May 28, 2014), https://archives.cjr.org/united_states_project/murray_energy_defamation_l
awsuits_huffington_post.php.
77. Litvak, supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. See Peters, supra note 76.
80. See id. (alteration in original).
81. Litvak, supra note 76.
82. 25 N.E.3d 1111 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).
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enact an anti-SLAPP statute after review of the case.83 And earlier that
year, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio attorney,
Jonathan Peters, authored an article in the Columbia Journalism
Review detailing the history of Murray Energy and its CEO’s penchant
for filing lawsuits against the press and argued for Ohio to adopt antiSLAPP legislation.84 At the time of this writing, approximately six
years later, twenty-nine states have anti-SLAPP legislation on the
books; however, Ohio is not one of them.85
Several states have attempted to combat SLAPP suits by
fashioning special remedies available to litigation targets. Some
statutory remedies will apply only after defendants have concluded
litigation; these solutions therefore offer incomplete relief because the
SLAPP filer might have already achieved the goal of disrupting the
target’s protected First Amendment speech and chilling future free
speech efforts.86 Select states have directly addressed this issue by
formulating statutory remedies to help facilitate a quick resolution to
SLAPP litigation.87 For instance, in New York, the trial court can
dismiss an alleged SLAPP suit unless the filer can show that the
lawsuit has “a substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”88
Similarly, Maine courts have created a “special motion to dismiss”
which allows a trial court to grant early dismissal unless the SLAPP
filer can show that the target’s activities were without a reasonable
basis in law or fact, and that those activities led to actual injury.89
Unfortunately, early dismissal and cost-shifting remedies address
only an immediate SLAPP suit—and not instances where a party
exhibits a clear pattern of such suits. When a plaintiff is a habitual
SLAPP filer, such has been the case with Murray enterprises, then a
different remedy must be fashioned.
83. Id. at 1124–25.
84. See Peters, supra note 76.
85. Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, MEDIA L. RES. CTR.,
http://www.medialaw.org/topics-page/anti-slapp (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).
86. Johnston, supra note 2, at 279.
87. Id.
88. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (MCKINNEY 2020); see also Johnston, supra note 2, at 279
(explaining that section 3211(g) provides a “more immediate remedy” than statutory schemes that
“apply only after the target has been subjected to a considerable course of litigation”).
89. ME. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2019); see also Johnston, supra note 2, at 280 (“[A] SLAPP
target in Maine may bring a ‘special motion to dismiss.’ The trial court will grant the motion unless
the SLAPP filer can show that the target’s public participation activities were without a reasonable
basis in fact or law, and that those activities led to actual injury.”).
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B. West Virginia and the Absence of Anti-SLAPP Legislation
West Virginia currently lacks anti-SLAPP legislation, despite
introduction of an anti-SLAPP bill in the past.90 In 2016, a new study
committee was appointed to consider “the need for and feasibility of”
an anti-SLAPP Act by the West Virginia Commission on Uniform
State Laws, which was to report its findings to the West Virginia
legislature.91 And recall also that in the context of our case study, two
2017 actions were filed in West Virginia by Murray—one against the
New York Times and the other against Oliver and other defendants.92
Note that, significantly, curtailing SLAPP suits in West Virginia
comports with the state’s legacy of protecting a citizen’s constitutional
free speech rights.93 While West Virginia lacks anti-SLAPP
legislation to date, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
always been protective of the chilling effects of SLAPP suit
litigation.94 If a lawsuit interferes with a citizen’s right to free speech
with “insufficient allegations,” the case cannot proceed to trial if the
remedy sought “is manifestly inadequate to protect against the chilling
effect of allowing a suit to proceed.”95 And notably, West Virginia’s
Constitution is “more stringent” in its free speech protections than the
national Constitution.96

90. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text.
91. W. VA. COMM’N ON UNIF. STATE L., REPORT TO THE WEST VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE
REGULAR SESSION 2017, at 8 (2017), http://www.wvlegislature.gov/legisdocs/reports/agency/C0
6_FY_2017_13670.pdf.
92. See The N.Y. Times Complaint, supra note 42, at 1; Oliver Complaint, supra note 40, at
1.
93. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text.
94. See generally Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of L. Exam’rs, 266 S.E.2d 444 (W. Va. 1980)
(explaining that West Virginia’s Constitution imposes limits the state’s power “to inquire into
lawful associations and speech more stringent than those imposed on the states by the Constitution
of the United States”); Woodruff v. Bd. of Trs. of Cabell Huntington Hosp., 319 S.E.2d 372, 379
(W. Va. 1984) (holding that public sector employees cannot waive by contract their constitutionally
protected speech guarantees, and collective bargaining agreements that abrogate these fundamental
rights are void under the West Virginia Constitution); State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan, 480 S.E.2d
548, 565 (W. Va. 1996) (stating that participants in public debate “must steel themselves to harsh
criticism that does not exceed the actual malice privilege” mandated by both the United States
Constitution and West Virginia’s Constitution).
95. Suriano, 480 S.E.2d at 551, 554. As the court notes, “[p]rohibition will lie to prohibit a
case from proceeding to trial when the remedy of appeal is manifestly inadequate to protect against
the chilling effect of allowing a suit to proceed because the complaint, as a matter of constitutional
law, contains insufficient allegations to warrant interference.” Id. at 551 (quoting Long v. Egnor,
346 S.E.2d 778, 779–80 (W.Va. 1986)).
96. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text. The West Virginia State
Constitution reads in pertinent part:
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Harris v. Adkins97 is the leading case regarding SLAPP suits in
West Virginia, and it stands on the shoulders of Webb v. Fury.98 Webb
was, in fact, one of the most powerfully worded opinions in the nation
regarding the importance of protecting free speech from the chilling
effect of frivolous litigation; Webb was handed down in the context of
SLAPP suits gaining traction in the courts in the 1970s and 1980s.99
In 1981, before the articulation of the “SLAPP” suit per se by
commentators Penelope Canan and George Pring,100 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals argued in Webb that the “cost to society in
terms of the threat to our liberty and freedom is beyond calculation”
with regard to deciding whether to allow a defamation lawsuit by a
coal company against a citizen critical of that company to proceed in
court.101 Furthermore, the court stated that “[s]urface mining, and
energy development generally, are matters of great public concern,”
and that vigorous debate and the free exchange of ideas are the
“adhesive of our democracy.”102
More specifically, in Webb, a community organizer was sued
under a defamation claim for filing citizen complaints against the
DLM Coal Corporation for violations related to mining practices and
for circulating a newsletter describing mining impacts on streams in
Upshur County, West Virginia.103 DLM sued Webb and
environmental groups for, among other things, libel as a result of the
publication and circulation of the newsletter.104 Webb filed a writ of
No law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, shall be passed; but the
Legislature may, by suitable penalties, restrain the publication or sale of obscene books,
papers, or pictures, and provide for the punishment of libel, and defamation of character,
and for the recovery, in civil actions, by the aggrieved party, of suitable damages for
such libel, or defamation.
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
97. 432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1993).
98. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981), overruled by Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va.
1993). The issue in Webb was whether the defendant in the matter had absolute immunity in
petitioning the government under the West Virginia State Constitution, article III, section 16,
allowing for a writ of prohibition. Id. at 30–31, 34–35 The court held in the affirmative. Id. at 43.
Harris v. Adkins overruled Webb to the extent that there was absolute immunity under the West
Virginia State Constitution, article III, section 16, changing the standard from absolute immunity
to actual malice as articulated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Harris, 432 S.E.2d at 550 (citing
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
99. Pring & Canan, supra note 74, at 940, 943.
100. Pring, supra note 5, at 3–4.
101. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 30–31, 43.
102. Id. at 43.
103. Id. at 31.
104. Id.
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prohibition asserting that under the West Virginia Constitution, the
lawsuit must be terminated because he had absolute immunity in his
action of petitioning government.105 After applying the NoerPennington doctrine, the court in Webb agreed.106 The Court argued
that speech on matters of great public concern definitively belongs
outside of the courthouse—as it is necessary to maintain a
democracy.107
Despite the Webb court being concerned with a citizen’s right to
petition the government, “its primary concern was the chilling effect
of litigation on a citizen who was exercising a sensitive constitutional
right, which was at the heart of the litigation.”108 The fact that there is
no absolute immunity does not diminish this line of reasoning; what is
more, the “actual malice” standard established in New York Times, Co.
v. Sullivan109 functions as a powerful preventative measure against
potentially frivolous litigation.110 Ultimately, then, West Virginia’s
robust history of protecting citizens from the chilling effect of
frivolous litigation supports the argument that SLAPP suits should be
curtailed.
The dissent in Webb argued that the court’s approach was too
broad, and the opinion was, in fact, partially overturned a decade later,
aligning the “actual malice” standard with New York Times v.
Sullivan.111 Justice Neely proposed a three-stage test for these types of
lawsuits.112 First, the test requires a prima facie showing if the plaintiff
seeks damages or an injunction; second, a preliminary hearing at the
early stages of the case is required to determine if the suit is reasonable
and brought in good faith; and third, the test requires that the plaintiff
pay full costs to the defendant if the case goes to trial but loses on the
substantive merits.113 On the third factor, Justice Neely proposes that
if, after the trial, “it becomes apparent that the plaintiff actually was
using the legal process . . . to oppress citizens who have legitimately
exercised first amendment rights, then the courts should exercise their
105. Id. at 30–31, 34.
106. Id. at 34, 37, 42.
107. Id. at 43.
108. Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778, 781 (W. Va. 1986) (discussing Webb).
109. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
110. Id. at 280.
111. See Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 43–44 (Neely, J., dissenting); Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549,
552 (W. Va. 1993).
112. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 47.
113. Id.
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equitable powers to impose costs against the plaintiff in excess of the
actual costs of defending the case.”114 Note, however, that while
Justice Neely’s proposed test focuses on the imposition of costs on
bad-faith filers, we instead contend below that non-monetary attorney
sanctions ultimately would constitute a more effective deterrent.
Justice Neely’s dissent thus recognizes the need for enhanced
mechanisms to protect courts from abusive litigation practices and to
safeguard constitutionally protected free speech.115 Specifically,
Justice Neely states that “[t]he potential for chilling legitimate first
amendment rights when there is anything less than absolute immunity
is awe inspiring. The key to solving this dilemma is finding a device
which will screen legitimate first amendment activity from
irresponsible or sham first amendment activity.”116
The subsequent failure of the West Virginia legislature to enact
anti-SLAPP legislation despite its introduction and consideration
therefore has left defendants without a statutory shield against
retaliatory lawsuits.117 Despite the lack of anti-SLAPP legislation in
West Virginia, however, there are mechanisms inherent in Rule 11 of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and pertinent case law that
can be utilized to combat such frivolous lawsuits—as we argue below.
And such remedies also, of course, could be fruitfully explored in
similarly situated jurisdictions that lack such comprehensive statutory
shields (e.g., Ohio, as also implicated in our present case study).
C. Rule 11
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires four
representations by the attorney to the court.118 In sum, the attorney
certifies that the pleading, written motion, or other paper: (1) is not
being presented for any improper purpose; (2) the claims, defenses,
and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law;119 (3) the
factual contentions have evidentiary support; and (4) the denials of
factual contentions are warranted on the evidence.120
114. Id.
115. Id. at 47–48.
116. Id. at 46. As discussed infra in Part V.A, we suggest one such test for screening legitimate
First Amendment activity from the use of the justice system to chill free speech.
117. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text.
118. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
119. Or reversing existing law or for establishing new law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). As Rule 11(b) states from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
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As the ACLU of West Virginia argues in its amicus curiae brief,
sanctions can be levied by the court on parties who bring cases for an
improper purpose and can be used to deter future conduct.121 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure likewise provide a mechanism to
discourage the filing of frivolous lawsuits or suits filed for an
“improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation” by levying sanctions against
attorneys or the parties they represent for such filings.122
One may contend that monetary fines are sufficient to compensate
the injured party when punitive damages are taken into account.
However, attorneys who file frivolous briefs may be able to ex ante
protect themselves by simply charging a higher fee to pass the risk
onto the client.123 Additionally, filers may rationally determine that the
benefits of filing such frivolous suits outweigh the costs—in that
removing the debate from a public forum to the legal arena would
justify any direct monetary costs associated with filing a lawsuit.124
Additionally, if the attorney is afraid of losing a lucrative client, she
or he may be more willing to file a frivolous lawsuit in an effort to
appease the client.125 Consequently, use of enhanced non-monetary
sanctions against attorneys likely would prove more effective in
deterring such frivolous lawsuits.126
(b) REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT. By presenting to the court a pleading,
written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
Id. Rule 11(c) outlines the procedure for imposing sanctions under these circumstances. FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(c).
121. ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 45, at 10; see also Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463,
466 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1990).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c); see also supra text accompanying note 120.
123. See infra Part V.B.1 on the cost-benefit analysis that factors into filing a SLAPP suit.
124. See infra Part V.B.1 on the cost-benefit analysis that factors into filing a SLAPP suit.
125. See infra Part V.B.1.
126. See infra Part V.B.1.
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D. History of Federal Rule 11
1. Overview
In J. Reid Mowrer’s 1998 article proposing the use of Rule 11 to
curb SLAPP suits, he succinctly addresses the history of Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.127 In 1983, Rule 11 was
amended to enhance its effectiveness as a deterrent—i.e., to ultimately
“broaden the scope of sanctionable actions, raise the standard of
attorney behavior and encourage the application of sanctions as a
deterrent tool.”128 However, in the amended Rule 11’s subsequent
application, there was an “explosion of sanctions litigation” that
“tipped the balance inappropriately towards deterrence at the expense
of free access.”129 As is unpacked below, the 1993 amendments, then,
attempted to address this imbalance by “broaden[ing] the scope of
sanctionable activity while placing greater constraints on the
imposition of sanctions.”130
2. 1991 Survey of Rule 11
In 1991, the Federal Judicial Center published a final report on
Rule 11 to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the United States.131 The report included “(1) a survey
of all federal district judges about their experiences with Rule 11; (2)
an analysis of all district and appellate opinions published between
1984 and 1989 that address Rule 11 issues; and (3) a study of Rule 11
activity in five district courts.”132 Regarding the effectiveness of Rule
11 in deterring “groundless” litigation, a majority found the Rule
effective; however, a majority of judges also did not classify such
litigation as a substantial problem.133 In fact, 38 percent of judges
reported that “half or more requests for sanctions are themselves
groundless.”134 Further, and particularly at issue here, the majority of
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Mowrer, supra note 10, at 476–80.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 479–80.
See generally ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET. AL., FED. JUD. CTR., RULE 11: FINAL REPORT
TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 1 (1991), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Rule11FR.pdf (providing an
overview of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 with three major components that provide an
analysis of Rule 11 as it pertains to all federal district judges and appellate opinions).
132. Id. at Overview and Acknowledgements Section.
133. Id. at 1.
134. Id.
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judges found other mechanisms and rules to be more effective in
addressing groundless litigation, including “prompt rulings on
motions to dismiss and prompt rulings on motions for summary
judgment. . . . informal admonitions and Rule 16 conferences.”135 The
analysis of Rule 11 cases in five district courts looked at “(1) the
amount of satellite litigation generated by Rule 11; (2) the extent to
which Rule 11 activity has been disproportionately concentrated in
specific types of cases or on particular type of litigants; and (3) the
amount of judicial variation in sanctioning practices.”136
One of the questions asked was whether a particular type of party
was being disproportionately subjected to Rule 11.137 The most
“targeted” pleadings were complaints.138 Thus, unsurprisingly,
plaintiffs were “slightly or substantially more frequently” targeted
than defendants.139 Civil rights cases tended to be targeted more than
other types of suits.140 The percentage of orders imposing sanctions in
the five districts ranged from 9 percent to 55 percent.141 In the context
of civil rights cases and Rule 11, sanctions were more frequently
imposed on plaintiffs and their attorneys.142 Monetary awards were the
most common form of sanction, as compared to non-monetary
sanctions such as admonitions or ordering continuing legal education
classes.143 The monetary amounts were low, and one hypothesis of the
authors was that “[t]hey may represent a deliberate effort to avoid the
over-deterrence of employment discrimination claims.”144
E. Non-Monetary Sanctions
Courts are required to consider non-monetary sanctions under
Rule 11(c).145 A wide variety of non-monetary sanctions are available
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id. at 1.
137. Id. at 13.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 14.
140. Id. at 15–17.
141. Id. at 17–19.
142. Id. at 5.
143. Id. at 5–6.
144. Id. at 6. Note that, for the purposes of this Article, compiling empirical data on Rule 11
rulings proved difficult because of the limitations of the various legal databases and the early stages
at which some of the Rule 11 motions are brought, particularly if the issue results in dismissal at
the 12(b)(6) stage. Because of these limitations, it is difficult to get a fair assessment of the
frequency with which the types of cases at issue are burdening the court system.
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
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to the court including: injunctions, admonitions, reprimands, censures,
referrals to disciplinary authorities, required participation in
educational programs (e.g., mandatory continuing legal education),
professional trainings, an order precluding the introduction of certain
evidence, an order precluding the litigation of certain issues, and
dismissal of the action.146 Courts also have the ability to consider
disciplinary action against lawyers who violate Rule 11. In fact, the
intent behind the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 was to encourage more
disciplinary referrals and to transition away from fee awards.147 Most
courts, however, do not avail themselves of this remedy, preferring
instead to bring the offending conduct to the attention of the
appropriate disciplinary committee rather than directly disciplining
the attorney.148 Some commentators argue that the appropriate state
disciplinary body should investigate any lawyer who has received
more than one Rule 11 sanction and that federal district clerks could
easily effectuate such measures by reporting sanctions to state
authorities.149
Courts can sua sponte sanction an attorney; however, in doing so,
a court may run afoul of due process issues.150 This is because when
judges initiate disciplinary referrals for serious professional
misconduct during civil litigation, they have both prosecutorial and
judicial functions.151 Furthermore, judges can occupy a legislative role
if the guidelines are unclear and also can occupy the role of a witness
if the misconduct occurred in their presence.152 With this said, less
serious violations, which often require sanctions such as a reprimand
or a fine payable to the court, can be effectively administered by the
presiding trial judge to promote general deterrence.153
146. Id.; see also Comm. on Fed. Cts., Comments on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and
Related Rules, 46 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 267, 300–01 (1991) (listing the non-monetary
sanctions imposed under Rule 11).
147. Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal Civil Rule 11, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 37, 46 (1993).
148. GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES AND
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 574 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004).
149. Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75
MINN. L. REV. 793, 808–09 (1991).
150. See Thornton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions violated due process).
151. Parness, supra note 147, at 45.
152. Id. at 45–46.
153. Id. at 60. Some courts have argued that they need not recuse themselves from sua sponte
Rule 11 sanctions. See, e.g., Lemaster v. United States, 891 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1989). Other courts
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IV. USING RULE 11 TO DETER ATTORNEYS FROM FILING FRIVOLOUS
SUITS
We contend that in the absence of anti-SLAPP legislation in
jurisdictions such as West Virginia, the court may utilize Rule 11 to
give attorneys pause before filing lawsuits violative of the First
Amendment. If a plaintiff demonstrates an egregious pattern and
practice of filing SLAPP-like suits, with typical SLAPP related claims
repetitiously, with blatant “cut-and-pasted” complaints, the court, on
motion or sua sponte, can utilize the power vested in it by Rule 11 to
impose sanctions, in excess of costs and fees by including enhanced
disciplinary action.154
The remedy must be greater than attorney’s costs and fees,
because the costs at such an early stage of dismissal would not be a
sufficient deterrent.155 That is, an “appropriate level of deterrence” can
be reached if the sanctions are more than simply costs and fees.156
Thus, the risk of disciplinary action against an attorney may cause the
attorney to pause and think twice before filing a frivolous SLAPP suit.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by its explicit
construction, is designed in part to deter abusive litigious behavior.157
This rule is well-suited to deter those who seek to chill free speech
because “[t]he SLAPP filer focuses on use of the judicial process, as
opposed to any anticipated judicial product, to silence the
opponent.”158 Victor Kramer has argued that “courts should consider
and interpret Rule 11 primarily as a tool to enforce the Rules of
Professional Conduct in litigation rather than as a means to
compensate litigants who become the victims of unprofessional
conduct: deterrence rather than reimbursement should be the primary
purpose of sanctioning lawyers.”159
Furthermore, courts can impose sanctions sua sponte under Rule
11(c)(3), which provides: “On the Court’s Initiative. On its own, the
court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why
have recused themselves. See, e.g., Edwards v. Groner, 24 V.I. 292 (D.V.I. 1989); see also VAIRO,
supra note 148, at 413 (citing cases in which courts have recused themselves or abstained from
recusal after raising sanctions sua sponte).
154. Mowrer, supra note 10, at 484–85.
155. Id. at 485–86.
156. Id. at 486.
157. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
158. Mowrer, supra note 10, at 466.
159. Kramer, supra note 149, at 797.
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conduct specifically described in the order has not violated Rule
11(b).”160 Thus, to impose sua sponte sanctions, a court must issue an
order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, and the
order must describe the specific conduct believed to violate Rule 11.161
Courts are limited in the types of sanctions that are imposed when
raising sua sponte Rule 11 violations.162 Non-monetary sanctions are
available; however, monetary sanctions can only be imposed on
motion.163
A. ABA Sanction Survey and Attorney Discipline
Cosentino argues that one solution is to penalize attorneys for
bringing SLAPP suits through “disciplinary proceedings or monetary
sanctions,” causing them to think twice before representing a chronic
SLAPP filer.164 Numerous considerations factor into the calculus to
determine if sanctions against the attorney are the appropriate remedy.
At a minimum, however, the determination to use sanctions should
include the nature of the sanctioned conduct, its consequence on
others, and the purposes to be served by the sanctions.165
Plaintiff’s counsel cannot evade bad faith arguments simply
based on the fact that the client asked counsel to conduct the case and
draft allegations in a specific manner. These arguments have been
considered and dismissed by the Fourth Circuit.166 Accordingly,
arguments based on client desires and conduct should not be utilized
as an excuse for filing frivolous lawsuits. So long as counsel knows
that the suit is frivolous, “[c]ounsel can no longer avoid the sting of
Rule 11 sanctions by operating under the guise of a pure heart and
empty head.”167
A brief survey of disciplinary action imposed by the Supreme
Court of West Virginia within the last five years did not reflect any
strong trend as to who was subject to such action or why.168 What these
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3).
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2)–(3); see Parness, supra note 147, at 45.
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(B).
163. Id.
164. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 410.
165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
166. Blair v. Shenandoah Women’s Ctr., Inc., 757 F.2d 1435, 1438 (4th Cir. 1985).
167. Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1488 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Zuniga v. United Can Co.,
812 F.2d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 1987)).
168. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N: CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO .
DISCIPLINE, 2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (S.O.L.D.) (2018),
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data appear to reveal is that imposition of disciplinary sanctions, at
least in West Virginia, is used sparingly, particularly the harsher
impositions, such as debarment.169
Issues with using disciplinary sanctions against attorneys include
a potential SLAPP suit being insufficient in and of itself to spur action
by a disciplinary board, the inability of citizens making complaints to
“distinguish a frivolous claim from a legitimate claim,” the inability
of judges and attorneys to recognize a SLAPP suit as such, and “a
general reluctance” of judges and attorneys to report each other.170 As
the data provided demonstrate, there may be difficulty in finding
success via disciplinary action.
B. Attorney Discipline as a Remedy
Rule 11 was broadened under the 1983 amendments. Specifically,
Rule 11 was amended to require a “‘reasonable inquiry’ from the
attorney concerning his client’s claims and defenses.”171 The 1983
amendments included two important changes: (1) the scope of Rule 11
was broadened to apply to a greater range of pleadings; and (2)
sanctions were mandatory when a violation was found.172
Interestingly, these changes to Rule 11 led to increased litigation, most
likely due to the rule’s broader scope and fee-shifting power.173
Additionally, some attorneys would use sanctions as a weapon or
bargaining tool to help leverage negotiations with opposing
counsel.174
Under the 1993 amendments, the aim of Rule 11 sanctions was to
pivot away from compensation and towards deterrence.175 Per the
amendments, the focus was less on attorney’s fees and more on such
deterrence-focused mechanisms as fines paid to the court and shifting
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2016sol
d_results.pdf [hereinafter 2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS] (showing a history of
past ABA S.O.L.D. surveys lacking an ascertainable trend over five years up to and including
2018).
169. See id.
170. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 419.
171. James W. Devine, Note, Rule 11’s Big-Mouthed Little Brother: How a Federal AntiSLAPP Statute Would Reproduce Rule 11’s Growing Pains, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 367, 384 (2011).
172. Id.; see also Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 190–93
(1988) (discussing the controversy around amendments made to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 11).
173. Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 598–99 (1998).
174. Devine, supra note 171, at 385.
175. Parness, supra note 147, at 46.

(12) 54.2_TU & STUMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/23/21 9:58 AM

2021] FRIVOLOUS SLAPP SUITS AND RULE 11 SANCTIONS

651

misconduct fine responsibility to not just attorneys, but also to
attorneys’ law firms via joint responsibility principles.176 Other
mechanisms such as continuing legal education requirements,
reprimands, and referrals to bar disciplinary entities also could be
favored via a deterrence-based approach.177
Attorney discipline as a sua sponte remedy by the court in the
anti-SLAPP suit context should alleviate some concerns emanating
from the potential use of sanctions as a bargaining tactic. Lawyers
could still use attorney sanctions as a bargaining tool, but they would
no longer receive any monetary benefits as part of the remedy.
Accordingly, frivolous Rule 11 motions should not be an issue
because the fee-shifting remedy would not be an option for litigants.178
Furthermore, the use of sanctions as a bargaining tool would also be
diminished because these sanctions would be court initiated, and not
initiated at the bequest of litigants.179 However, one potential
stumbling block with such a sua sponte remedy is the due process issue
mentioned in Part III.F above.
C. Current Use of Rule 11 Sanctions: Suspension and Debarment
Courts have been reluctant to use the sanctioning power of Rule
11.180 State bars also rarely use suspension or debarment as a means
of deterring bad behavior. The American Bar Association (ABA) has
been collecting data regarding sanctions, caseloads, budget, and
staffing for public and educational use.181 The result, the Survey in
Lawyer Discipline Systems (S.O.L.D.), provides statistics on lawyer
discipline from many jurisdictions nationally.182 The ABA has
historical surveys dating back to 1998.183
West Virginia has participated in all surveys except those
conducted in 2013, 2012, 2005, 1999, and 1998.184 According to the
176. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The New Monetary
Sanctions for the “Stop-and-Think-Again” Rule, 1993 BYU L. REV. 879, 903.
177. Id. at 890.
178. Devine, supra note 171, at 387.
179. Id.
180. Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, supra note 173, at 623.
181. See generally 2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, supra note 168 (showing
data related to a 2016 survey regarding lawyer discipline systems).
182. See id.
183. See Historical ABA S.O.L.D. Surveys, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/resources/historicalabasoldsurveys/ (last visited Nov. 22,
2020).
184. Id.

(12) 54.2_TU & STUMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

652

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

4/23/21 9:58 AM

[Vol. 54:623

2016 report, West Virginia had 6,856 lawyers with active licenses, and
the disciplinary agency received 596 complaints.185 Three hundred
and forty of those complaints were from prior years, 232 of those
complaints were summarily dismissed or screened out, and 936 were
investigated.186 297 were dismissed after the investigation.187 Eighteen
of the lawyers were ultimately charged, 18 publicly disciplined, 6
involuntarily disbarred, 5 suspended (excluding interim suspensions),
4 suspended in the interim for risk of harm or criminal convictions, 3
were admonished, reprimanded, or censured, 3 placed on probation, 3
ordered to pay restitution, and 13 ordered to pay costs.188 Interestingly,
there were two motions or requests for reinstatement and readmission:
one was granted after debarment and one was granted after
suspension.189
V. PROPOSED TEST FOR APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINE
The purpose of this novel four-part test is to discriminate between
those suits brought for legitimate reasons versus those frivolous suits
that are brought about to silence the media or prevent citizens from
voicing legitimate concerns against private parties or the government.
Although it does not appear that these suits happen with great
frequency, when such suits are brought, they have the ability to wreak
substantial, far-reaching harms to both free speech and public
participation—i.e., including multidimensional harms emanating from
later-in-time chilling effects.190 This four-part test would help
determine if the SLAPP suit falls within the most egregious forms of
frivolous litigation and suggest a remedy that is based in large part on
deterring the filing of future frivolous suits. Accordingly, this test must
consider the parties involved, damages requested, as well as how this
litigation functions within the SLAPP filer’s broader strategy to
silence dissident voices.
In summary, this test weighs four main factors: (1) a pattern of
conduct and similarity of complaints; (2) the nature of the defendants;
(3) proportionality of damages; and (4) if a countersuit is at issue. If
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, supra note 168, Chart 1, pt. A, 3.
Id. Chart 1, pt. B, 3.
Id.
Id.; id. Chart 3, pt. B, 4.
Id. Charts 4, 3.
See Pring & Canan, supra note 74, at 941–44.
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these factors weigh heavily in favor of the defendant, then the true
intent of the filer may be suppression of protected free speech.
Consequently, enhanced attorney sanctions in the form of suspension
or debarment may be an appropriate remedy to deter future filings of
a similar, deeply problematic nature.
A. Test for Applying Attorney Sanctions
1. Pattern of Conduct
As one important factor, enhanced attorney sanctions are likely
an appropriate remedy for frivolous litigation when the plaintiff
habitually files “cookie-cutter” suits. If deterrence indeed is the
ultimate goal, when a party exhibits a clear pattern of utilizing the legal
system to suppress free speech, then attorney sanctions are the
appropriate remedy. Note, however, that direct evidence of specific
intent to file a suit for harassment purposes will seldom be found; thus,
intent can be inferred by the surrounding circumstances. If a plaintiff
consistently files suits using the same arguments with the same fact
pattern without proffering a new legal argument—and if the suits are
consistently dismissed at either the 12(b)(6) or summary judgment
stage—then this strongly evidences a pattern of misconduct.
For example, Robert Murray has filed no less than six suits
against news and media organizations, as well as some individuals, to
suppress their free speech rights.191 Unsurprisingly, most of these suits
have not survived the 12(b)(6) or the summary judgement motions by
defendants.192 Although one or two suits may not be enough to
establish that the filer is improperly wielding the legal system to harass
and silence the media, six or seven suits should suffice.
Courts should further consider if the defamation filer uses
identical complaint language in multiple cases or otherwise alleges the
same type of fact pattern. As discussed above in Part II.B, six
complaints filed by Murray Energy, Robert Murray, or one of the
subsidiaries had multiple paragraphs that were either identical or
nearly identical.193 Tables 1 and 2 review the language used in the
complaints filed by Robert Murray as well as the outcomes of these
suits. These “cookie-cutter” complaints with near-identical
191. See sources cited supra note 67 and accompanying text; infra Table 2.
192. See infra Table 2.
193. See infra Table 1.
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language—i.e., as combined with the pattern of conduct and the suits’
ultimate dismissals—help demonstrate the improper purpose of the
suits.194
Note also that potential watchdog entities may occupy a helpful
role in tracking such problematic complaint patterns. For instance, Lili
Levi argues that one response to corporations targeting media via
indirect funding for litigation (i.e., as discussed above) can involve
cultivating private watchdogs in the form of institutions or pertinent
concerned individuals.195 Such watchdogs could track corporate
funds, enhance public knowledge about such practices, and generally
advocate for greater corporate funding accountability, best press
practices, and so forth.196 Therefore, in the context of our case study
and broader discussion, watchdog entities similarly could track
litigants who exhibit a pattern of filing frivolous lawsuits with “cut
and paste” complaint language—which would further the “goal of
promoting transparency and accountability” among these problematic
repeat actors.197
2. Nature of the Defendants
This second factor reflects an important principle: that to support
the public interest, greater protection should be provided to some types
of litigants than others. Because the ultimate goal of Rule 11 is to deter
frivolous litigation, the anti-SLAPP privilege should be more
expansive for those parties that disseminate factual information or that
give legitimate analyses to authentic newsworthy information. Thus,
this factor would provide greater protection to legitimate news
organizations that report factual material with additional explanations,
observations, or interpretations.
In a defamation suit, the classification of the party already is
considered one potential defense against defamation—namely under
“qualified privilege.” Qualified privilege is the special legal right or
immunity given to parties for acts committed in performance of a legal
or moral duty and are exercised free from malice. The defense is stated
as a communication whose “essential elements . . . are good faith, an
interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to the upholding
194.
195.
196.
197.

See infra Table 1.
Levi, supra note 29, at 817.
Id.
Id.
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of such interest and publication in a proper manner only to proper
parties.”198 One archetypal example of the qualified privilege is the
immunity for members of the press for statements made in good
faith—such as the media organizations at issue in our present Murray
case study. Accordingly, providing greater protection to one type of
party in a defamation suit—i.e., including in the explicit context of the
press—does not tread new legal ground.
In summary, then, if the defendant in a SLAPP suit is a media or
news organization simply reporting truthful facts, then courts should
take this into account beyond the simple “absolute immunity” defense
in a defamation suit. On the other side of the coin, if the plaintiff in a
SLAPP suit is a bad-faith actor that repeatedly brings similar suits
based on similar facts, courts should weigh this factor accordingly.199
3. Proportionality of Damages
As a third factor, we suggest a proportionality analysis where the
court examines the claimed violation and damages requested.
Damages in a tort case are designed in large part to compensate the
victim—i.e., to make the party whole. When the damages requested
are disproportionate to the alleged harm, then the victim is seeking
either punitive damages or the deterrent value of the suit. Accordingly,
if the damages requested by the filer are so high as to be disassociated
from the reality of the harm done to the victim, then the more likely
the filer is using the case to improperly suppress free speech.
For example, in the 2001 Murray suit against the Akron Beacon
Journal for a defamation claim, the alleged damage suffered was $1
billion.200 However, in 2005, for instance, Murray Energy’s total sales
amounted to only $450 million.201 It is therefore very unlikely that this
article published in a relatively regional market could damage
Murray’s entire business to the point of bankruptcy twice over.
198. Dobbyn v. Nelson, 579 P.2d 721, 723 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978), aff’d, 587 P.2d 315 (Kan.
1978) (quoting Senogles v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 1358 (Kan. 1975)); see also A.G.
Harmon, Defamation in Good Faith: An Argument for Restating the Defense of Qualified Privilege,
16 BARRY L. REV. 27 (2011) (providing a historical investigation on the original meaning of
“Defamation in Good Faith” and argues for a return to this first understanding).
199. See supra Part V.A.1.
200. Al Cross, Controversial Coal Operator Threatens to Sue Coal Age Editor, Penn State
Professor over Criticism, THE RURAL BLOG (Sept. 25, 2007, 11:37 AM), http://irjci.blogspot.co
m/2007/09/murray-threatens-to-sue-editor.html.
201. MILLION DOLLAR DIRECTORY SERIES: AMERICA’S LEADING PUBLIC & PRIVATE
COMPANIES 2006, at 3276 (2005).
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Accordingly, the damages requested were grossly disproportionate to
the alleged harm done—and thus this fact constitutes additional
circumstantial evidence indicating that the suit was filed for purposes
other than simple compensation to make the victim whole.
4. Not a Countersuit
As a final factor, SLAPP suits must be differentiated from
“countersuits.”202 Countersuits differ from SLAPP suits because the
original party—i.e., an environmental group or other type of public
interest organization—is not simply voicing an opinion on a specific
cause, but instead files suit to halt an action that the organization
believes is harmful. In response, similar to a traditional SLAPP suit,
the defendant will file a countersuit to intimidate the original plaintiff.
These environmental and related countersuits should not be
subject to immediate attorney sanctions for three significant reasons.
First, the original party that filed suit is typically a large environmental
organization familiar with the judicial system. Second, when filing the
original suit, the initial filer often will have access to a relatively large
amount of capital, and thus will not suffer from individual liability or
the psychological toll associated with litigation targeted at individual
citizens. Third, as the original filer was the first to bring suit, there is
a smaller likelihood of deterring future parties from filing suit or from
raising public attention on the issue due to fear of financial retribution.
Therefore, unlike a traditional SLAPP suit target that is simply using
the political process to air their grievances, those parties subject to
countersuits can anticipate and prepare for the possibility of legal
retaliation. Additionally, unlike a traditional SLAPP suit, the filer is
not moving the discussion from the public forum to a legal forum
because the original discussion began in a legal context.
In the context of our case study, in all instances in which Murray
filed suit, such actions were against news organizations or individuals
that spoke out critically against Murray Energy or Robert Murray as
its CEO. As a consequence, the conduct at issue was standard media
criticism and did not originate as a lawsuit against Murray enterprises.
202. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 405; David Sive, Countersuits, Delay, Intimidation Caused
by Public Interest Suits, NAT’L L.J., June 19, 1989, at 5; see also Note, Counterclaim and
Countersuit Harassment of Private Environmental Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its Implications, and
Proposed Solutions, 74 MICH. L. REV. 106 (1975) (discussing the basic characteristics of the
counterclaim strategy, the implications of its future proliferation, and proposals to eliminate the
impact of the strategy in terms of its effectiveness).
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Murray was therefore the instigator who sought to move the case from
a political forum to the legal arena—and the countersuit factor
discussed above, then, is not applicable.
B. Attorney Sanctions as a Remedy
Anti-SLAPP remedies—such as the enhanced sanctions we
explore below—are especially important when utilized to protect the
press in its mission of disseminating truthful information to the public
about potential bad actors. This is, of course, a vital watchdog function
in healthy democracies. What is more, the sanctions we explore below
also comport with the current rubric of Rule 11—in that, namely, when
looking to SLAPP-type behavior under Rule 11, the most important
court determination is whether the suit is being brought to harass or
silence news or media organizations, concerned individual citizens, or
related entities.
1. Costs and Benefits Associated with Filing a SLAPP Suit
As introduced above in this Article, monetary compensation often
proves insufficient in deterring attorneys from filing frivolous suits
because (1) firms may simply charge the client more to file these suits
as a risk-shifting practice; and (2) clients may be willing to take these
risks via a simple cost-benefit analysis. On the latter point, a rational
SLAPP suit filer may determine that the benefits of filing a suit greatly
outweigh the potential direct costs. First, the actual monetary costs of
filing a suit may be low. If the filer simply “cuts and pastes” much of
the complaint from prior complaint language, then the costs to file
indeed are minimal. Additionally, if a suit is dismissed at the 12(b)(6)
stage and attorney costs are shifted to the filer, the costs may be
minimal because the dismissal was at such an early litigation stage.
Moreover, attorneys may be willing to file these frivolous suits to
maintain a good relationship with the client for work that is
independent of the SLAPP suit. Furthermore, the ultimate benefits of
suppressing media coverage can be enormous, especially when the
chilling effects on potential later-in-time negative publicity are
considered. Millionaires such as Murray and the lawyers who work
for him, therefore, often are willing to risk tens of thousands of dollars
in filing a SLAPP suit when the benefits of silencing negative
publicity could equal an estimated much greater amount.
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To actually deter these types of “cookie-cutter” frivolous suits,
then, remedies should not be directed against the powerful, wellcapitalized client—but rather at the lawyers who file such suits despite
their institutional expertise and clear professional ethics
responsibilities. Consequently, in such egregious circumstances,
enhanced attorney sanctions such as suspension or debarment are an
appropriate remedy.
2. Attorney Suspensions and Debarment Already Comport with Rule
11(b)
Rule 11(b) sets out the requirements for documents that attorneys
present to the court.203 There are four main requirements enumerated
in Rule 11(b): (1) documents are not being presented for any improper
purpose; (2) the claims, defenses, and other contentions are warranted
by existing law or argument for altering existing law; (3) factual
contentions have evidentiary support; and (4) denials of factual
contentions are warranted.204
As an initial matter, the requirements of Rule 11(b)(3) and (4)
deal with factual contentions and are typically not at dispute in this
variety of SLAPP litigation. That is, when looking to the four
representations that are required under Rule 11, the factual contentions
are usually not at issue since all parties admit to the factual
contentions. For example, in the context of the Murray litigation
against Oliver, neither party contested the factual information
disclosed in Oliver’s segment as it was aired on national television.
Accordingly, there is no issue with the affirmative duty to investigate
the facts of the case because the facts are uncontested.
Rule 11(b)(2), however, is directly at issue for this variety of
SLAPP suit. Rule 11(b)(2) requires that the attorney certify that “the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”205 Rule 11
“explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each
attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading
before it is signed.”206 Additionally, Rule 11 “imposes a duty on
203.
204.
205.
206.

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985).
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attorneys to certify that they . . . have determined that any papers filed
with the court are well grounded in fact, legally tenable, and ‘not
interposed for any improper purpose.’”207
In our case study, we find a violation of Rule 11(b)(2) as exhibited
by Murray’s decades long pattern of litigation. The lawyers
representing Murray clearly used a boilerplate complaint because the
complaint was “cut and pasted” from previous complaints used against
other news organizations.208 For instance, Murray’s defamation cause
of action against Oliver was nearly identical to the complaints brought
against the New York Times in 2017 and the Huffington Post in
2013.209 The false light invasion of privacy cause of action against
Oliver also was nearly identical to the complaints brought against Bill
Moyer in 2014 and the Huffington Post in 2013.210 The lawyers filing
Murray’s complaint therefore knew they were filing a case based on
very similar facts and knew the outcome of these cases were either
dismissal or summary judgment. And because these complaints were
nearly identical to the previous failed cases, the complaints do not
convey additional facts suggesting a “nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing
new law.”211
Significantly, note that an example of sua sponte Rule 11
sanctions in response to this boilerplate type of pleading can be seen
in Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.212 In Rodgers, the court
stated “[t]hese boilerplate allegations evincing counsel’s carelessness
in drafting and filing this complaint only illustrate the appropriateness
of the district court’s assessing sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.”213
The court’s argument certainly is apropos to attorney conduct in the
Murray litigation context as well.
Finally, Rule 11(b)(1) requires that the attorney certify that the
document submitted to the court is “not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”214 The first factor of the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (emphasis added).
See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 204 n.6.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
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four-part test proposed above in Part V.A.1 helps determine if the
filing was effectuated with the intent to suppress free speech or, in the
alternative, to legitimately compensate the victim for harm done by a
tortfeasor. As noted above, direct evidence of the specific intent to file
a suit for harassment purposes will seldom be found, so intent must be
inferred from the surrounding circumstances.
C. Finding Balance Within the First Amendment: Free Speech v.
Access to the Courts
Just as the First Amendment protects free speech, it also protects
access to the courts.215 Neither right is absolute. However, where a
party exhibits a clear pattern of practice in filing retaliatory litigation
to silence critics, the use of the judicial process for the purpose of
suppressing free speech rights interferes with the administration of
justice—thus making it an improper, sanctionable filing under Rule 11
of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure in the context of our
case study (i.e., and comparable Rule 11 violations in the broader
United States).216
Since 2001, Murray Energy or a subsidiary, and Robert Murray,
sometimes together and sometimes apart, have sued media entities for
claims linked to defamation eleven times,217 and a union treasurer for
statements made to a newspaper three times.218 Since 2012, eight of
those suits, excluding the Oliver suit, were filed and all but one
(regarding a radio ad) were related to media or the press.219 The
negative impacts on free speech emanating from these frivolous
lawsuits did not go unnoticed by the courts nor by the media.220 In
Murray v. Knight-Ridder,221 the case settled, and the article was
215. Mowrer, supra note 10, at 465 n.2, 475.
216. W. VA. CODE. ANN. R. 11 (LexisNexis 2021).
217. Claims varied, including defamation, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference of contract, and civil
conspiracy. See infra Table 1.
218. E.g., Murray v. Tarley, No. C2-01-693, 2002 WL 484537, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2002).
219. See, e.g., id.
220. Peters, supra note 76; Murray v. Chagrin Valley Publ’g Co., 25 N.E.3d 1111, 1125 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2014) (expressing that the case exemplified the need of adoption of anti-SLAPP legislation
to prevent chilling effects of this type of litigation); Murray Energy Holdings Co. v. Mergermarket
USA, Inc., No. 15-CV-2844, 2016 WL 3365422, at *7, *8 (S.D. Ohio June 17, 2016) (stating “a
party who seeks a prior restraint ‘carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition
of such a restraint’” with regard for the request of a declaratory judgment preventing publication
of information).
221. No. 02 BE 45, 2004 WL 333250 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2004).
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retracted.222 After threatening litigation, Coal Age published an
apology to Murray.223 One of the defendants in Murray v. Chagrin
ended up “scrubb[ing]” its website of the article at issue, despite
settlement.224
The court in Chagrin—in essentially classifying the case as a
SLAPP suit—wrote in its opinion that such frivolous lawsuits “can be
devastating to individual defendants or small news organizations and
act to chill criticism and debate. The fact that the Chagrin Valley Times
website has been scrubbed of all mention of Murray or this protest is
an example of the chilling effects this has,” and the court also
recommended that the Ohio legislature adopt anti-SLAPP
legislation.225 However, as noted above, Ohio has not adopted such a
statutory shield, nor has West Virginia or numerous other
jurisdictions.226 Moreover, as also noted above, after the Chagrin
opinion was published in December 2014, Murray filed lawsuits
against Bloomberg in Ohio and the New York Times and John Oliver
in West Virginia.227 To be sure, such prior decisions did not constitute
an actual deterrent for Murray Energy or Robert Murray as its CEO—
and likely also will not deter those future-in-time, well-capitalized
entities that are all-too-eager to suppress critical speech of news
organizations and the like following a simple cost-benefit analysis.
The people have the right to “petition the government for a
redress of grievances.”228 As discussed above, civil rights lawsuits
have historically been a target of Rule 11 motions.229 As Cosentino
also argues, any solution “must not deny plaintiffs due process of law”
or otherwise be violative of the U.S. Constitution.230 And tort claims
of an unusual character are not inherently illegitimate.231 Thus, any
222. Peters, supra note 76.
223. Id.
224. Chagrin, 25 N.E.3d at 1124.
225. Id. at 1124–25.
226. Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, supra note 85. West Virginia does have case law
that provides some anti-SLAPP protection. See, e.g., Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va.
1993).
227. Murray Energy Holdings Co. v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 2:15-CV-2845, 2016 WL 3355456
(S.D. Ohio June 17, 2016); Oliver Complaint, supra note 40, at 1; The N.Y. Times Complaint,
supra note 42, at 1.
228. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
229. Wiggins et. al., supra note 131, at 15–19.
230. Cosentino, supra note 14, at 412.
231. The West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure permit a “non frivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” W. VA. CODE.
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rule drafted to protect free speech must also protect the right to petition
government.232 However, as we have argued in this Article, a remedy
involving more severe attorney sanctions—i.e., as carefully weighed
by courts utilizing the four-part test proffered above—strikes the
necessary balance between access to courts and constitutionally
protected free speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
Numerous media outlets, newspapers, and concerned individual
citizens lack the resources required to combat frivolous defamation
suits brought by powerful, well-capitalized entities.233 As the court in
Chargin articulates, SLAPP suits “can be devastating to individual
defendants or small news organizations and act to chill criticism and
debate.”234 Moreover, the multidimensional benefits of SLAPP suits
typically outweigh the financial costs to such powerful actors—as our
case study in the form of Murray Energy and Robert Murray as its
CEO so aptly demonstrates. Consequently, while recognizing the
delicate balance between free speech and access to the courts—and in
the absence of anti-SLAPP legislation—enhanced Rule 11 sanctions,
including attorney suspension and debarment, can be utilized by courts
to deter such abusive litigation tactics. And the novel four-part test
proffered in this Article could closely inform courts’ weighing and
levying of such sanctions. Ultimately, such a judicial corrective could
help protect the constitutionally protected free speech rights of the
press and of concerned citizens, which indeed are central to a wellfunctioning democracy.

ANN. R. 11(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2021). Similarly, 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits a “nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
232. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 47–48 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely, J., dissenting), overruled by
Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1993).
233. See Murray Corporate Overview, supra note 37.
234. Murray v. Chagrin Valley Publ’g Co., 25 N.E.3d 1111, 1124 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).
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Table 1. Detailed Complaint Comparison235

John Oliver
(2017)236

New York
Times (2017)237

Count I—
Defamation:
¶ 21— Plaintiffs
reallege all of
the above
paragraph of
this Complaint
as if fully set
forth herein.
Count I— Defamation: Count I—
¶ 59—Upon information Defamation:
and belief, Defendants
¶ 22—Upon
caused the Defamatory information and
Statements to be
belief,
published with
Defendant
knowledge of the falsity caused the
of those statements or
Defamatory
with reckless disregard Statement to be
as to the falsity of those published with
statements.
knowledge of
the falsity of
those statements
or with reckless
disregard as to
the falsity of
those
statements.

Huffington Post
(2013)238
[detailed
12(b)(6) grant
to defendant]

Chagrin
(2013)239
[(1) Summary
Judgment for
defendant; (2)
appealed—
affirmed]

Moyer
(2014)240
[12(b)(6)
dismissed
because
statutes of
limitations ran]

Count I—Defamation:
¶ 58—Plaintiffs restate
and reallege all of the
other paragraphs of this
Complaint as if fully set
forth herein.

¶ 41—Upon
information and
belief,
Defendants
caused the
Defamatory
Statements to be
published with
knowledge of
the falsity of the
statements
contained
therein or with
reckless or
negligent
disregard as to
the truth or
falsity of said
statements.

235. For Table 1, the litigation outcomes for unlisted cases were as follows: Tarley (2002)
[12(b)(1) granted for defamation]; Knight-Ridder (2004) [(1)—summary judgment for defendant,
(2) reverse for Murray].
236. See generally Oliver Complaint, supra note 40.
237. See generally The N.Y. Times Complaint, supra note 42.
238. See Murray v. TheHuffingtongPost.com, Inc., 13 CV 347 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Sept.
24, 2013).
239. See Murray v. The Chagrin Valley Publishing Company, CV 13 811106 (Ohio Ct.
Common Pleas July 23, 2013).
240. See Murray v. Moyers, 14 CV 321 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Oct. 20, 2014).
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Count I— Defamation:
¶60—The Defamatory
Statements are
defamatory per se in that,
on their face, they reflect
upon Plaintiffs’
reputation and character
in a manner that: (1)
injured Plaintiffs’
reputation and subject
Plaintiffs to public
hatred, ridicule, shame,
or disgrace; and (2)
adversely affected
Plaintiffs’ trades or
businesses. In the
alternative, the
Defamatory Statements
are defamatory per quod
in that they are capable
of being interpreted as
reflecting upon
Plaintiffs’ reputation or
character in a manner
that: (1) injured
Plaintiffs’ reputation or
expose them to public
hatred, ridicule, shame,
or disgrace; and (2)
adversely affected
Plaintiffs’ trades or
businesses.

Count I—
Defamation:
¶23—The
Defamatory
Statements were
defamatory per
se in that, on
their face, they
reflect upon
Plaintiffs’
reputation and
character in a
manner that: (1)
injured
Plaintiffs’
reputation and
subjects
Plaintiffs to
public hatred,
ridicule, shame,
or disgrace; and
(2) adversely
affected
Plaintiffs’ trades
or businesses. In
the alternative,
the Defamatory
Statements are
defamatory per
quod in that they
are capable of
being
interpreted as
reflecting upon
Plaintiffs’
reputation or
character in a
manner that: (1)
injured
Plaintiffs’
reputation or
exposes them to
public hatred,
ridicule, shame,
or disgrace; and
(2) adversely
affected

Count I—
Defamation:
¶29—The
Defamatory
Statements are
defamatory per
se in that, on
their face, they
reflect upon the
Murray
Plaintiffs’
reputation and
character in a
manner that: (1)
injures Murray’s
reputation and
subject Murray
to public hatred,
ridicule, shame,
or disgrace; and
(2) adversely
affects Murray’s
trades and/or
businesses. In
the alternative,
the Defamatory
Statements are
defamatory per
quod in that they
are capable of
being interpreted
as reflecting
upon Murray’s
reputation
and/or character
in a manner that:
(1) injures
Murray’s
reputation
and/or exposes
him to public
hatred, ridicule,
shame, or
disgrace; and (2)
adversely affects
his trades and/or
businesses.

[Vol. 54:623

(12) 54.2_TU & STUMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/23/21 9:58 AM

2021] FRIVOLOUS SLAPP SUITS AND RULE 11 SANCTIONS
Plaintiffs’ trades
or businesses.
Count I— Defamation: Count I—
¶61—The Defamatory
Defamation:
statements were
¶24—The
published and continue Defamatory
to be published with
Statements were
malice and without
published and
lawful privilege or basis. continue to be
published with
malice and
without any
lawful privilege
or basis.
Count I— Defamation: Count I—
¶ 61—The Defamatory Defamation:
Statements were
¶24—The
published and continue Defamatory
to be published with
Statements were
malice and without any published and
lawful privilege or basis. continue to be
published with
malice and
without any
lawful privilege
or basis.

Count I—
Defamation:
¶30—The
Defamatory
Statements were
published with
malice, and
without any
lawful privilege
or basis.

Count I—
Defamation:
¶ 31—
Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements has
caused and will
continue to
cause Murray
and members of
Murray’s family
to suffer great
mental anguish
and emotional
distress.
Count I— Defamation: Count I—
Count I—
¶ 62— Publication of the Defamation:
Defamation:
Defamatory Statements ¶ 25—
¶ 36—
will cause Plaintiffs to
Publication of
Publication of
encounter more difficulty the Defamatory the Defamatory
in securing performance Statements will Statements will
surety bonds from
cause Plaintiffs cause the
lenders to support their to encounter
Murray
businesses and Plaintiffs more difficultly Plaintiffs to
may have to collateralize in securing
encounter more
them at higher levels,
performance
difficulty in
and publication of the
surety bonds
securing
Defamatory Statements from lenders to performance
already caused Plaintiffs support their
surety bonds
harm in this regard by
businesses and from lenders to
damaging their
Plaintiffs may
support
reputations with such
have to
Murray’s and
lenders.
collateralize
may cause the

Count I—
Defamation:
¶44—The
Defamatory
Statements were
published with
malice, and
without any
lawful privilege
or basis.
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them at higher
levels.

Count I— Defamation:
¶ 63— Publication of the
Defamatory Statements
will cause lenders to be
less willing to engage in
financing transactions
with Plaintiffs, thereby
preventing them from
gaining access to capital
needed to operate their
businesses or making it
more difficult and
expensive for them to
obtain such capital, and
publication of the
Defamatory Statements
already has caused
Plaintiffs harm in this
regard by damaging their
reputations with such
lenders.

Count I—
Defamation:
¶ 26—
Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements will
cause lenders to
be less willing
to engage in
financing
transactions
with Plaintiffs,
thereby
preventing them
from gaining
access to capital
needed to
operate their
businesses or
making it more
difficult and
expensive for
them to obtain
such capital.

Count I— Defamation:
¶ 64— Publication of the
Defamatory Statements
will cause Plaintiffs to
encounter difficulty in
having effective
discussions with public
officials, including
regulatory agencies,
regarding matters of
concern to Plaintiffs’
businesses, and
publication of the
Defamatory Statements
already has caused
Plaintiffs harm in this

Count I—
Defamation:
¶ 27—
Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements will
cause Plaintiffs
to encounter
difficulty in
having
discussions with
public officials,
including
regulatory
agencies,
regarding

Murray
Plaintiffs to
have to
collateralize
these bonds at
higher levels.
Count I—
Defamation:
¶ 37—
Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements will
cause lenders to
be less willing
to engage in
financing
transactions with
the Murray
Plaintiffs,
thereby
preventing them
from gaining
access to capital
needed to
operate their
businesses or
making it more
difficult and
expensive for
them to obtain
such capital.
Count I—
Defamation:
¶ 38—
Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements will
cause the
Murray
Plaintiffs to
encounter
difficulty in
participating in
discussions with
public officials,
including
regulatory

[Vol. 54:623
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regard by damaging their
reputations with such
public officials and
agencies.

matters of
concern to
Plaintiffs’
businesses.

agencies,
regarding
matters of
concern to the
Murray
Plaintiffs’
businesses.
Count I— Defamation: Count I—
Count I—
¶ 65— Publication of the Defamation:
Defamation:
Defamatory Statements ¶ 28—
¶ 39—
will cause Plaintiffs to
Publication of
Publication of
suffer a loss of business the Defamatory the Defamatory
opportunities and loss of Statement will Statements will
potential or existing
cause Plaintiffs cause the
customers for their
to suffer a loss Murray
businesses, and
of business
plaintiffs to
publication of the
opportunities
suffer a loss of
Defamatory Statements and loss of
business
already has caused
potential or
opportunities
Plaintiffs harm in this
existing
and loss of
regard by damaging their customers for
potential and/or
reputations with such
their businesses. existing
potential and existing
customers for
customers.
their businesses.
Count I— Defamation: Count I—
¶ 68— Publication of the Defamation:
Defamatory Statements ¶ 29—
has caused and will
Publication of
continue to cause
the Defamatory
damage to Plaintiffs’
Statements has
reputation and good
caused and will
standing in their
continue to
community and industry. cause damage to
Plaintiffs’
reputation and
good standing in
their community
and industry.
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Count II—False Light
Invasion of Privacy:
¶ 70—The
Defamatory Statements
constitute false light
invasion of privacy in
that the Defamatory
Statements have
subjected Plaintiffs to
unreasonable and
highly objectionable
publicity by attributing to
them characteristics,
conduct, or beliefs
that are false, thereby
placing them in a false
light before the public.

Count II—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy:
¶ 41—The
Defamatory
Statements
constitute false
light invasion of
privacy in that
the Defamatory
Statements have
subjected the
Murray
Plaintiffs to
unreasonable
and highly
objectionable
publicity by
attributing to
them
characteristics,
conduct or
beliefs that are
false, thereby
placing the, in a
false light before
the public.

Count II—False light
invasion of privacy:
¶71—The false light in
which Plaintiffs have
been placed due to
publication of the
Defamatory Statements
would be highly
offensive to a reasonable
person.

Count II—False
light invasion of
privacy:
¶42—The false
light in which
the Murray
plaintiffs have
been placed due
to publication of
the defamatory
statements
would be highly
offensive to a
reasonable
person.

[Vol. 54:623
Count I—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy (All
defendants):
¶ 21—The
Broadcast
constitutes false
light invasion of
privacy in that
the Defendant
Moyers and
Defendant PAT
subjected Mr.
Murray and
Murray Energy
to unreasonable
and highly
objectionable
publicity by
attributing to
them
characteristics,
conduct,
activities, or
beliefs that are
false, thereby
placing Mr.
Murray and
Murray Energy
in a false light
before the
public.
Count II—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy (All
defendants):
¶22—The false
light in which
Defendant
Moyers and
Defendant PAT
placed Mr.
Murray and
Murray Energy
is highly
offensive to any

(12) 54.2_TU & STUMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/23/21 9:58 AM

2021] FRIVOLOUS SLAPP SUITS AND RULE 11 SANCTIONS

669

reasonable
person.
Count II—False Light
Invasion of Privacy:
¶ 72—Defendants
had knowledge of the
falsity of the Defamatory
Statements or acted in
reckless disregard as to
the falsity of
the Defamatory
Statements and the false
light in which Plaintiffs
would be placed.

Count II—False Light
Invasion of Privacy:
¶73—Publication of the
Defamatory Statements
has caused and will
continue to cause
Plaintiffs and members
of Mr. Murray’s family
to suffer great mental
anguish and emotional
distress.

Count II—False Light
Invasion of Privacy:
¶ 74—Publication of the
Defamatory Statements
will cause Plaintiffs to
encounter more difficulty
in securing performance
surety bonds from
lenders to support their

¶ Count II—
False Light
Invasion of
Privacy:
43—Defendants
had knowledge
of the falsity of
the Defamatory
Statements or
acted in reckless
disregard as to
the falsity of the
Defamatory
Statements and
the false light in
which
the Murray
Plaintiffs
would be placed.
Count II—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy:
¶44—
Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements has
caused and will
continue to
cause Murray
and members of
Murray’s family
to suffer great
mental anguish
and emotional
distress.
Count II—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy:
¶ 49—
Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements will
cause the
Murray

Count I—
Defamation:
¶45—
Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements has
caused and will
continue to
cause The
Murray
plaintiffs and
members of
Murray’s family
to suffer great
mental anguish
and emotional
distress.

Count I—False
light invasion of
privacy (All
defendants):
¶26—The
Broadcast has
caused and will
continue to
cause Mr. Murry
and members of
his family to
suffer great
mental anguish
and emotional
distress.
Count I—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy (All
Defendants):
¶ 29—The
Broadcast will
cause Mr.
Murray and
Murray Energy
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businesses and Plaintiffs
may have to collateralize
them at higher levels.

Count II—False Light
Invasion of Privacy:
¶ 75—Publication of the
Defamatory Statements
will cause lenders to be
less willing to engage in
financing transactions
with Plaintiffs, thereby
preventing them from
gaining access to capital
needed to operate their
businesses or making it
more difficult and
expensive for them to
obtain such capital.

Count II—False Light
Invasion of Privacy:
¶ 76—Publication of the
Defamatory Statements

Plaintiffs to
encounter more
difficulty in
securing
performance
surety bonds
from lenders to
support
Murray’s
businesses and
may cause the
Murray
Plaintiffs to
have to
collateralize
these bonds at
higher levels.
Count II—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy:
¶ 50—
Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements will
cause lenders to
be less willing
to engage in
financing
transactions with
the Murray
Plaintiffs,
thereby
preventing them
from gaining
access to capital
needed to
operate their
businesses or
making it more
difficult and
expensive for
them to obtain
such capital.
Count II—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy:
¶ 51—

[Vol. 54:623
to suffer great
difficulty in
security
performance
surety bonds
from lenders to
support their
businesses and
may require Mr.
Murray and
Murray Energy
to collateralize
these bonds at
higher levels.

Count I—False
Light Invasion
of privacy (All
defendant):
¶ 30—The
Broadcast will
cause lenders to
be less willing
to engage in
financing
transactions
with Mr. Murray
and Murray
Energy, thereby
preventing them
from gaining
access to capital
needed to
operate their
businesses and
making it more
difficult and
more expense
for them to
obtain such
capital.
Count I—False
Light Invasion
of privacy (All
defendant):

(12) 54.2_TU & STUMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/23/21 9:58 AM

2021] FRIVOLOUS SLAPP SUITS AND RULE 11 SANCTIONS
will cause Plaintiffs to
encounter difficulty in
having effective
discussion with public
officials, including
regulatory agencies,
regarding matters of
concern to Plaintiffs’
businesses.

Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements will
cause the
Murray
Plaintiffs to
encounter
difficulty in
participating in
discussions with
public officials,
including
regulatory
agencies,
regarding
matters of
concern to the
Murray
Plaintiffs’
businesses.

Count II—False Light
Invasion of Privacy:
¶ 77—Publication of the
Defamatory Statements
will cause Plaintiffs to
suffer a loss of business
opportunities and loss of
potential or existing
customers for their
businesses.

Count II—False Light
Invasion of Privacy:
¶ 78—Publication of the
Defamatory Statements
will cause Plaintiffs to
suffer a loss of business
opportunities and loss of
potential or existing
vendors.

671

¶ 31—The
Broadcast will
cause Mr.
Murray and
Murray Energy
to encounter
difficulty in
participating in
discussions with
public officials,
including
regulatory
agencies,
regarding
matters of
concern to their
businesses.

Count I—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy (All
Defendants):
¶ 32—The
Broadcast will
cause Mr.
Murray and
Murray Energy
to suffer a loss
of business
opportunities
and loss of
potential or
existing
customers for
their businesses.
Count II—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy:
¶ 52—
Publication of
the Defamatory
Statements will
cause the
Murray
Plaintiffs to
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[Vol. 54:623

suffer a loss of
business
opportunities
and loss of
potential and/or
existing
customers for
their businesses.
Count II—False Light
Invasion of Privacy:
¶ 79—Publication of the
Defamatory Statements
has caused and will
continue to cause
damage to Plaintiffs’
reputation and good
standing in their
community and industry.

Count II—False Light
Invasion of Privacy:
¶ 79—Publication of the
Defamatory Statements
has caused and will
continue to cause
damage to Plaintiffs’
reputation and good
standing in their
community and industry.

Count I—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy (All
Defendants):
¶ 27—The
Broadcast has
caused and will
continue to
cause Mr.
Murray to suffer
severe personal
and professional
humiliation and
injury to his
reputation as a
leader in the
coal mining
industry that he
has worked for
decade to build
and maintain.
Count I—False
Light Invasion
of Privacy (All
Defendants):
¶ 33—The
Broadcast has
caused and will
continue to
cause damage to
Mr. Murray’s
and Murray
Energy’s
reputation and
good standing in
their community
and industry.
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Table 2. Litigation Outcome Analysis
Party and
Case #
John Oliver;
17-0124

Venue and
Judge
Circuit Court,
Marshall, WV;
Judge Jeffrey
Cramer

Huffington
Post; 13 CV
347; 2:13cv-01066GLF-TPK

Common Pleas,
Belmont County,
OH; Judge
Gregory Frost

Chagrin
Valley
Publishing
Co.; CV 13
811106; 13
CV 14

Court of Appeals
of OH, 8th
District; Judge
Frank Celebrezze
[Originally filed
in
Common Pleas,
Cuyahoga
County, OH]

Bloomberg;
15W290;
2:15-CV2845

Law Firm and
Lawyers
Grove,
Holmstrad &
Delk; Grove
(6065)
Delk (6883)
Porter, Wright,
Morris, &
Arthur; Stemm
(0023146)
Hughes
(0070997)
Porter, Wright,
Morris, &
Arthur; Stemm
(0023146)
Hughes
(0070997)
KcKown
(0013378)
Broadbent
(0083876)
Anderson (pro
hac vice)
McGuire
Woods;
Marsico
(0070741)
Moore
(0092716)

Cause of
Relief
Similar
Action
Requested Complaint Result
Defamation/
Invasion of
Privacy/IIED
Defamation/ General,
Invasion of special and
Privacy
punitive
damages
(>$25k)

Defamation/ (Appeal of [Publisher Affirmed SJ;
Invasion of a SJ
actually
also had a
Privacy
motion)
removed all section that
mention of suggests OH
Murray from adopt antiwebsites— SLAPP
example of statutes to
chilling free stop chilling
speech]
free speech

Common Pleas,
Belmont County,
OH;
D/C SD of OH
Eastern Division;
Chief Judge
Algenon Marbley
Bill Moyers; Common Pleas, Cabral
14 CV 321; Belmont County, Edgars
2:14-CVOH; Judge Frank Sharp
02334
Fregiato;
D/C SD OH
Eastern Division

Trade Secret/
Tortious
Interference
with Contract

Carlo Tarley
[SecretaryTreasurer of
United Mine
Workers of
America];
C2-01-693

Defamation
[statements
made by
union worker]

D/C SD of OH
Eastern Division;
Judge Edmund
Sargus

12(b)(6)
Granted

Invasion of
Privacy

Actual
losses/
unjust
enrichment/
reasonable
royalty

12(b)(6)
Granted

[Court found 12(b)(6)
that Plaintiff Granted
tried to cast
Defamation
suit as
invasion of
privacy
because
defamation
was time
barred]
Motion to
Dismiss
Granted
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Court of Appeals Lieberman
of OH,
Shaheen
7th District;
Judge Joseph
Vukovich

Defamation

Reversal of
SJ

[Vol. 54:623
Granted
reversal of SJ
241

241. Note that a settlement was reached in Knight-Ridder. See, e.g., Newspaper, Coal Owner
Settle in Long-Running Case, ATHENS NEWS (Dec. 29, 2005),
https://www.athensnews.com/news/local/newspaper-coal-owner-settle-in-long-runningcase/article_f217f8fe-2fc9-5928-a25a-0eaadbb5d36f.html.

